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THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC REALITIES OF 
ARTIFICIALLY MANIPULATING A DECREASE/INCREASE OF EARNINGS 
PER SHARE - IF ANY 
CG Kilian 
E Snyman-Van Deventer 
1 Earnings per share: background and introduction 
1.1 Background 
The topic of earnings per share is certainly not a popular research topic, nor is it 
regularly encountered in law journals or case-law judgments. It remains a largely 
unexplored yet intriguing research area, and is known as the most unexamined field 
in company law. Not surprisingly, therefore, it is sometimes difficult to explain what 
the concept of earnings per share is. Schedule 4 to the Companies Act of 19731 
defines it as follows: 
… the earnings attributable to each equity share, based on the consolidated net 
income for the period, after tax, and after deducting outside shareholders' interest 
and preference dividends, divided by the weighted average number of that class of 
share in issue. 
The Companies Act of 2008,2 however, provides no definition or suitable explanation 
of earnings per share. 
In considering why a listed share has a very high or low price on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE Ltd), earnings per share constitute the economic basis for 
interpreting such a price. Although probably oversimplified, calculating "earnings per 
share" or the "earnings-per-share ratio" entails the activity of dividing the net profit 
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1  Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
2  Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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of a company by the number of its issued shares.3 There have been many responses 
to this core explanation. The economic reality is that companies may use innovation 
and creativity to lawfully engineer a better earnings-per-share ratio in order to 
attract more shareholder investments.4 Having thus determined that the relevant 
share price pertains to the number of issued shares, "earnings per share" 
encapsulates the economic reality that the number of issued shares may decrease 
artificially through creative engineering. After all, the law does not prohibit statutory 
financial engineering. 
The purpose of this article is to consider section 75 in the South African Companies 
Act of 1973, or its equivalent (section 36(2)) in the new South African Companies 
Act of 2008), and the topic of statutory approval for an artificial decrease or increase 
in the number of issued shares. The economic-reality argument is based on section 
85 of the Companies Act of 1973 or its equivalent in Act 2008 (sections 48 refers to 
section 46(1)c and section 46(1)c refers to section 4 of the Act), which illustrates 
that section 75 or its equivalent in the Act of 2008 (section 36(2)) is not subject to 
any liquidity or solvency requirements. In fact, section 75 or its equivalent in the Act 
of 2008 does not require a reason for limiting or preventing the artificial decrease or 
increase of the number of shares through financial engineering. 
1.2 Introduction 
Neither the Companies Act of 1973 nor that of 2008 makes any provision for the 
maximum or minimum amount of capital required to float a company, or the 
minimum number of shares that should be issued. This depends solely on the 
promoters' discretion of the number of shares that must equal the capital amount.5 
It is therefore possible that the promoters may excessively exercise their discretion 
when deciding on the authorised share capital, and later tailor-make or financially 
engineer the share capital structure of the business to make it attractive to 
                                        
3 Smullen and Hand Dictionary 148. 
4 Bannock, Baxter and Davis Dictionary 107. 
5 Cilliers et al Corporate Law para 16.20. The rules of the JSE require shares to be issued for at 
least R1 per share - see Amalgamated Packaging Industries (Rhodesia) Ltd 1963 1 SA 335 (SR); 
Ex Parte Rietfontein Estates Ltd 1976 1 SA 175 (W); Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
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shareholders or future shareholders.6 For example, the earnings per share are 
calculated by dividing retained profits (net profit) by the number of shares issued.7 
Similarly, a shareholder of a listed company could divide the market price per share 
of a listed company by the earnings per share in order to calculate the investment 
attractiveness of a listed share, which is known as the "price-to-earnings ratio".8 
This article considers possible methods of preventing or limiting artificial increases in 
earnings per share.9 The word "artificial" in this instance is not meant in the sense of 
an artificially inflated turnover, but rather to denote the artificial engineering of the 
number of issued shares to increase the earnings-per-share ratio, without an actual 
increase in the company's turnover or in the net profits through normal business 
operations. The word "artificial" should therefore be understood in the context of 
clever financial engineering of the number of shares issued to the shareholders of 
the company.10 First, however, it is important to consider the capital rule philosophy 
in South Africa pertaining to section 85 of the 1973 Companies Act as it was 
amended in Act 37 of 1999, and its significant contribution to the field of the 
maintenance of share capital in the 2008 Companies Act. 
                                        
6  Walsh Key Management Ratios 82. The excess cash will increase the "total assets" as disclosed 
in the balance sheet. The return on total assets ratio will thus produce an indication of ineffective 
asset utilisation by the management to produce sales/turnover. A promoter is not required to 
have any business background or financial qualifications to float a company. 
7 Benade et al Entrepreneurial Law 150. Although the company's constitution is a public document, 
the issue price par value is of no importance. This is clearly evident from the philosophy 
pertaining to no-par value shares. If an unlisted public company issues 20 million shares at 1c 
each, the earnings per share would be less than in the case of 10 million shares at 2c each.  
8 See in general Ex Parte Seafoods Successors Ltd 1957 3 SA 73 (D); Ex Parte Rattham & Son 
(Pty) Ltd 1959 2 SA 741 (SR); Ex Parte Associated Lead Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1960 2 SA 36 
(D). 
9  Stainbank and Harrod Meditari 91. These authors suggested that earnings per share should be 
stated in the company's financial statements. Also see De Villiers et al SEE 95; Auret and De 
Villiers 2000 SEE 39. 
10 Walsh Key Management Ratios 260-275; Vigario Managerial Accounting 285; Katzoff v Glaser 
1948 4 SA 630 (T) 636: "…the value of anything is what it is worth at the time". In Dean v Prince 
1954 1 All ER 749 (CA), the court remarked that there is no accountancy principle that fixes or 
limits the calculation of the value of shares. Also see Donaldson Investments v Anglo-Transvaal 
Collieries 1979 3 SA 713 (W) 731H-732B. 
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2 The new and old capital rule philosophy in South Africa 
2.1 The new philosophy (1999) 
Indeed, company law philosophy pertaining to capital rules has expanded rapidly in 
recent decades, partly due to the growing statutory importance of the new 
Companies Act 2008, and its economic significance to shareholders. Thus, as the 
relevant literature that covers the period from 1887 to 1999 is too voluminous to 
consider exhaustively, this article only briefly focuses on the significant law-
orientated contributions in the two separate timeframes of 1887 and 1999. For 
practical purposes the "new" capital rules introduced in 1999 by the amended 
section 85 of the 1973 Companies Act are discussed first. 
In terms of these rules, the company may acquire its own shares (as a method to 
decrease the number of issued shares), if the financial ratios in section 85 have been 
adhered to.11 The ratios as disclosed by section 85 as amended in Act 37 of 1999 are 
those most widely used in the financial industry to determine the financial position of 
a company before the company is allowed to acquire its issued shares, particularly 
the liquidity (cash in hand) and solvency ratios (assets exceed liabilities). The 
purpose of the "new" capital rules was to benefit the shareholders of the company 
without any prejudice to the company's creditors should the company decide to 
acquire its own shares.12 However, it has become increasingly obvious that the 
acquisition of own shares has quite the opposite, positive effect by influencing the 
earnings per share directly. This has interesting implications in the light of section 
85's requirement for creditor protection through the solvency and liquidity ratios. 
Before section 85 was amended in Act 37 of 1999, section 85 had no liquidity or 
                                        
11 Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999; Pretorius et al Company Law (6th ed) 121; Brews Take-
over Regulation 28, 142. 
12 Section 85(4) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973: "A company shall not make any payment in 
whatever form to acquire any share issued by the company if there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that - (a) the company is, or would after the payment be, unable to pay its debts as 
they become due in the ordinary course of business or (b) the consolidated assets of the 
company fairly valued would after the payment be less than the consolidated liabilities of the 
company." 
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solvency ratios as requirements to support or validate a buy-back of company 
shares.13 
Yet there are also certain drawbacks to these ratios as statutory requirements. As 
the balance statement of a company discloses the financial position of that company 
only on a specific date,14 an accountant can choose a date to "window-dress" the 
balance statement favourably so as to comply with the statutory ratios of section 85 
as amended in 1999.15 On the other hand, the balance sheet presents only a 
snapshot of the company's financial affairs on a specific day, and remains relevant 
until the next financial year-end (a twelve-month period). To neutralise the latter 
circumstance, one can argue that an auditor should instead disclose the weighted 
average cost of capital in relation to the internal rate of return in the company's 
balance sheet. If the internal rate of return is less than the weighted average cost of 
capital, this would imply that the company is unable to pay its debts as they become 
due, and should consequently not be allowed to acquire any of its shares.16 
Nevertheless, due to the difficulties associated with the correct calculation of an 
internal rate of return, the 2008 Companies Act has rectified this by introducing a 
time period of twelve months. In economic terms, the 2008 Act requires not only a 
solvency and liquidity ratio but also a twelve-month period to support or validate the 
buy-back of shares. Both the proposed Companies Bill of 200717 and the 2008 Act 
state as follows in section 4 (as referred to in sections 46 and 48) which is the 
equivalent of section 85 of the Act of 1999:18 
                                        
13  Section 85(1)-(3) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 required the permission of creditors to allow 
for a buy-back of company shares. 
14 Hoice Holdings Ltd v Yabeng Investment Holding Co Ltd 2001 3 SA 1350 (W); Capitex Bank Ltd v 
Qorus Holdings Ltd 2003 3 SA 302 (W). 
15 SAICA Financial Statements; Walsh Key Management Ratios 82. The cash-flow cycle also 
depends on the balance sheet information. Also see Klein v Kolosus Holdings Ltd 2003 6 SA 198 
(T); Cachalia v De Klerk and Benjamin 1952 4 SA 672 (T); Extel Industrial (Pty) Ltd v Crown Mills 
(Pty) Ltd 1999 2 SA 719 (SCA) 732F; Ilic v Parginos 1985 1 SA 795 (A) 803D; Kleynhans v Van 
der Westhuizen 1970 2 SA 742 (A); Knox D'Arcy Ltd v Jamieson 1996 4 SA 348 (A). 
16 See Donaldson Investments v Anglo-Transvaal Collieries 1979 3 SA (W) 731H, 732B. Shareholder 
value is not calculated by means of the earnings per share times the number of issued shares.  
17  Companies Bill, 2007 [B61-2008]. 
18 The 2008 Act contains similar wording. 
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(1) For any purpose of this Act, a company satisfies the solvency and liquidity test 
at a particular time if, considering all reasonably foreseeable financial circumstances 
of the company at that time – 
(a) the company's total assets equal or exceed its total liabilities; and 
(b) it appears that the company will be able to pay its debts as they became due in 
the course of business for a period of – 
(i) 12 months after the date on which the test is considered.19 
The time period included in this section has implicitly introduced the relationship 
between the internal rate of return and the weighted average cost of capital. Even 
though it is not a requirement to disclose this relationship in any financial statement 
to determine whether the company will actually be able to comply with the twelve-
month time period, it is at least a continuous requirement up to the next financial 
year-end. If the internal rate of return is less than the weighted average of the cost 
of capital, we can assume that the company will not be able to service its debts as 
they become due - thereby breaching the twelve-month time period.20 If it is able to 
pay its debts for a period longer than twelve months, this implies true company 
liquidity.21 On the other hand, the requirements in section 4 or 85 can be avoided by 
making use of section 75 or its equivalent (section 36(2)) in the 2008 Act. Section 75 
or section 36(2) requires no liquidity or solvency ratios nor a twelve-month time 
period as requirements to support or validate the decrease or increase in the 
number of issued shares. Due to the latter, the following question is posed: is the 
decrease or increase of issued shares an intra vires act? 
                                        
19 Section 4(1)(b)(i) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 also refers to 12 months. 
20 Atkinson Financial Collapse 46: "Notwithstanding the apparent success of the use of ratio 
analysis in the prediction of company failure, it should be noted that some researchers comment 
that, while ratios of failed firms were found to be significantly different from those of non-failed 
firms, the ability of such ratios to predict failure was not so conclusive." In this regard, the 
internal rate of return should be calculated and compared to the weighted average cost of 
capital. If the internal rate of return is less, the forecast value of the company would be less than 
that of a company able to create a greater internal rate of return.  
21 Black, Wright and Davies In Search of Shareholder Value 23: "We raise capital … sell it at an 
operating profit. Then we pay the cost of the capital. Shareholders pocket the difference." The 
greater the liabilities, the greater the weighted average cost of capital, and consequently, the 
less the profits. Also see Delport Verkryging van Kapitaal 205. 
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2.2 The old philosophy (1887) 
One of the cornerstones of company law is the matter Trevor v Whitworth.22 The 
Trevor case laid down a very important principle in 1887, although perhaps similar in 
part to section 48 of the Act of 2008,23 when Lord Herschell stated the common-law 
principle that a company24 is not allowed to buy-back its own shares unless a buy-
back is regulated in its constitution so as to allow for an intra vires act.25 This "old" 
rule as stated by Lord Herschell required no true liquidity/solvency to legitimise the 
buy-back of shares. It required only an intra vires act to support or validate any buy 
back of shares, or else the transaction would be ultra vires and void in the common 
law.26 Before it was amended in 1999, section 85 did not require an intra vires act to 
support or validate a buy-back of shares. On the other hand, section 75 required 
authorisation in the articles of association to decrease or increase the number of 
issued shares. If no authorisation was provided for in the articles of association, the 
decrease or increase constituted an ultra vires act. The same intra vires act is not 
per se a requirement in section 36(2) of the 2008 Act.27 However, neither section 85 
before it was amended (and after its amendment) nor section 75 seems to have 
been adequate in protecting the creditors of a company, since an ultra vires act 
could be set aside by the company in terms of section 36 of the 1973 Act .28 In the 
2008 Act, section 218 (2) simply states that any person who contravenes any 
provision of the 2008 Act is liable to any other person for any loss suffered, and 
section 218(1) continues that only a court has the power to declare an ultra vires act 
                                        
22 Trevor v Whitworth 1887 12 AC 409 (HL); Pretorius et al Company Law (6th ed) 122; Benade et 
al Entrepreneurial Law 180. 
23 Briggs 1981 De Rebus 293; Ex Parte Rietfontein Estates Ltd 1976 1 SA 175 (W); Meskin 
Henochsberg (4th ed) 135. Before the Act was amended, s 83 regulated the reduction of share 
capital; Jooste 2007 SALJ 710; Yeats and Jooste 2009 SALJ 566. 
24 Cilliers et al Corporate Law para 190.01: the shareholders are a personification of the company, 
and are in reality the company; see Meskin Henochsberg (4th ed) 135. 
25 Also see Cohen v Segal 1970 3 SA 702 (W) 706.  
26 Ex Parte NBSA Centre Ltd 1987 2 SA 783 (T) 785. In this regard, s 311 of the Companies Act 61 
of 1973 can be considered illegal in terms of reducing the share capital of the company through 
a buy-back of its own shares, unless so agreed by the members of the company. The 
consequence of an ultra vires act is that the buy-back is voided; Cassim 1998 SA Merc LJ 293; 
Cilliers et al Corporate Law para 12.14. 
27  Cassim 2005 SALJ 283. 
28 Meskin Henochsberg (5th ed) 179. 
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void or voidable. Consequently, the following paragraphs consider whether section 
85 as was amended or its equivalent in section 4, in economic reality, indeed offers 
sufficient protection for creditors stemming from any buy-back of shares.29 
2.3 The new capital rules introduced in 2008 and the need for a reason 
as a requirement to legitimise a buy-back of shares 
As stated above, the legal aspects of section 85 were not adequate to conclude 
whether the creditor or the company would be prejudiced due to a buy-back of 
shares,30 as it was possible for management to "window-dress" the balance sheet.31 
Irrespective of an intra vires act, the acquisition or buy-back depended on the 
balance sheet and whether the liquidity or solvency ratios had been met. 
Interestingly, the Trevor case32 considered a reason as an ancillary requirement to 
legitimise the acquisition or buy-back of shares. In that matter, Lord Herschell 
enquired as follows: "What was the reason which induced the company in the 
present case to purchase its shares?"33 
One such possible reason could be the prevention of a hostile takeover. Hostile 
takeovers have been covered in depth in law literature. The prevention of a hostile 
takeover relates more to the proper-purpose doctrine. For example, in the Hogg v 
Cramphorn case,34 the board of directors issued additional shares in an attempt to 
avoid a hostile takeover, since the allotment of shares was not subject to any 
liquidity or solvency ratios. Although the directors believed that the allotment was in 
the best interest of the company (the creditors of the company were not 
                                        
29 See in general Ex Parte Witwatersrand Board of Executors Building Society & Trust Co Ltd 1926 
WLD 205. 
30 Black, Wright and Davies In Search of Shareholder Value 23; Delport Verkryging van Kapitaal 
205. 
31 Kilian and Du Plessis 2005 TSAR 48; Van der Linde 2009 TSAR 224. 
32 Trevor v Whitworth 1887 12 AC 409 (HL); Pretorius et al Company Law (6th ed) 122; Benade et 
al Entrepreneurial Law 180. 
33 Pretorius et al Company Law (6th ed) 122. 
34 Hogg v Cramphorn 1967 Ch 254. 
CG KILIAN AND E SNYMAN VAN DEVENTER  PER / PELJ 2015(17)6 
2644 
 
prejudiced), the court nevertheless held35 that the additional allotment of shares was 
for an improper purpose. 
This judgment concurs with that in the matter Mills v Mills,36 where Chief Justice 
Latham held that: 
… the question that arises is sometimes not a question of the interest of the 
company at all, but a question of what is fair between the different classes of 
shareholders …37  
The reason for the latter statement is simply that, in economic reality, directors are 
also shareholders of a company, whose shares bear a direct relation to their own 
interests. Thus, if a director is advancing the interest of a company, he or she is also 
advancing his or her own interest in that company.38 Through additional allotment, 
the earnings per share will decrease, which makes for an easy argument against the 
additional allotment of shares. Besides the latter, section 85 or section 48 requires 
no valid reason for such a buy-back, and whether or not a buy-back contravenes the 
proper-purpose doctrine falls outside the scope of this article.39 However, it should 
be noted that any artificial increase in earnings per share to attract possible 
investors/shareholders should be interpreted as being improper.40 Section 52 of the 
2007 Bill also does not prohibit any artificial increase in earnings per share. It states 
the following: 
Shares of a company that have been issued and subsequently re-acquired by that 
company, must be returned to the same status as shares of the same class that 
have been authorized but not issued. 
                                        
35 Hogg v Cramphorn 1967 Ch 254 265. Judge Buckley held that the majority of shareholders were 
acting oppressively towards the minority and/or that the powers of the directors interfered with 
the shareholders' rights as stipulated in the company's constitution. 
36 Mills v Mills 1938 60 CLR 150 (High Court of Australia). 
37 Mills v Mills 1938 60 CLR 150 (High Court of Australia) 162. 
38 Mills v Mills 1938 60 CLR 150 (High Court of Australia) 162-163. 
39 Axiam Holdings v Deloitte & Touche 2006 1 SA 237 (SCA); Correia et al Financial Management 
512. The company's operations may create profit, but its future continuation depends on the 
availability of cash. 
40 Kilian and Du Plessis 2005 TSAR 48; In Re X Ltd 1982 2 SA 471 (W) 477; Ex Parte Coca Cola 
(Pty) Ltd 1947 3 SA 571 (T); Ex Parte National Industrial Credit Corporation Ltd 1950 2 SA 10 
(W); Berelowitz 1979 De Rebus 199, 202. A skilful broker can realise shares without affecting 
their current listed price. 
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And the 2008 Act also does not prohibit any artificial increase in earnings per share. 
Section 35(5)(a) states: 
Shares of a company that have been issued and subsequently acquired by that 
company, as contemplated in section 48, must have the same status as shares that 
have been authorized but not issued. 
Similarly, section 48(3)(b) (which is equivalent to section 85) also contains the 
requirement of a plausible reason relating to the status of shares. A company in a 
relationship with a subsidiary may not purchase those shares if there would be no 
other shares than convertible or redeemable preference shares in the subsidiary. 
Section 48(5)(c) requires a genuine reason, and prohibits a buy-back if the end 
result of such an acquisition of shares would prevent the company from fulfilling its 
financial obligations - being unable to pay the creditors of the company timeously. It 
should be noted that section 48 does not explicitly refer to an intra vires act, but 
refers to the requirements of section 46 in the event of a buy-back. Section 46(1)(a) 
requires a legal obligation, which could imply the company's constitution. 
In the following paragraphs, the focus shifts to the financial position of a company 
as a reason not to allow for a buy-back of shares or a decrease in the number of 
issued shares in terms of section 36(2). 
3 Financial obligations 
The equity or shareholders' fund is calculated by deducting liabilities from assets as 
disclosed in the balance sheet of the company. The book value of a share is 
determined by dividing the equity by the number of issued shares. This method is 
used for both par and no-par value shares in order to determine the book value of a 
company's shares,41 and can be illustrated as follows: 
  
                                        
41 Marx Investment Management 131-151. There are five different methods to calculate the value 
of a share, and a specific method serves a purpose in a specific circumstance, ie for a business 
to be valued as a going concern or not. 
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Number of shares Equity Book value 
100 R100 R1 per share 
*(100/100 = 1) 
In the Rabinowitz case,42 the court used the book value and not the market price of 
the shares to determine their value. Although this may be correct, it should be noted 
here that the market price of a share is not a confirmation of the value of the 
company as a going concern,43 but is merely used to calculate the current value of a 
listed share-capital company. This approach to calculating value is known as the 
market capitalisation of a listed company.44 The following serves to illustrate this: 
Number of shares Market price 
per share 
Market capitalisation 
(value of listed 
shares) 
100 R0,50 R50 
*(100 x .5 = 50) 
However, the book value of a going concern is important, as it illustrates the 
relationship between the market price of a listed share and the book value per 
share, in other words, whether the market price of the share is overvalued or 
undervalued compared to the book value per share, as follows: 
  
                                        
42 Rabinowitz v Ned-Equity Insurance Co Ltd 1980 1 SA 403 (W). 
43 Donaldson Investments v Anglo-Transvaal Collieries 1979 3 SA 713 (W) 731H-732B. The 
council's argument was that the net asset value or book value of shares is calculated as market 
cap (italisation). This is incorrect. 
44 See Berelowitz 1979 De Rebus 201. 
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Number of 
shares 
Equity Book value Market cap 
100 R10 000 R100 per share 
*(10 000/100 = 
100) 
R50 per 
share 
If the shares are undervalued upon comparing the book value to the market cap,45 
this indicates grounds for a possible takeover bid, for example to acquire the 
company for R50 when the book value of its shares is R100 (see the table above). 
Similarly, if the book value is less than the market cap, it indicates that the price 
listed for the shares is overvalued. In order to increase the book value of the shares 
the board of directors will largely focus on reducing the company's debt or liabilities. 
As the debt decreases, the equity of the company will increase, since the amount of 
the liabilities deducted in the income statement will be less. Therefore, equity in the 
balance statement will increase. To illustrate this, the debt-to-equity ratio - which is 
also important to obtain a holistic view of the book value of shares - is used to spot 
artificial increases in earnings per share or book value per share.46 
Instead of altering the debt-to-equity ratio, for example by paying off the debt, the 
board of directors can use section 48 to alter the capital structure of the issued 
shares, and consequently artificially raise the issued shares' book value. Although 
capital or cash is required to fund the acquisition, this can easily be avoided by using 
section 36(2) of the 2008 Companies Act, which also alters the capital structure of 
                                        
45 The market cap is calculated as the number of issued shares multiplied by the listed price per 
share. 
46 Geyser and Liebenberg 2003 Agrekon 106. The authors recommend the shareholder value-added 
method as the performance measurement of an enterprise's value in the future. In Smit 2007 
TGW 181, the author discusses why small- to medium-sized businesses fail in the commercial 
world, eg, because management does not undertake financial planning. The shareholder value-
added or the economic value-added method indicates whether management is able to perform 
financial planning adequately, as it makes use of a forecast of current management decisions, 
linking these to business value. Also see Donaldson Investments v Anglo-Transvaal Collieries 
1979 3 SA 713 (W) 731H-732B. 
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shares without any cash in return for shares.47 Thus, section 36(2) is the focus of the 
following paragraph. 
4 Altering the book value of shares without a buy-back 
Section 75 of the 1973 Companies Act provides for altering the composition of the 
number of issued shares in relation to the share capital of the company.48 Section 
75(1) states as follows: 
Subject to the provisions of sections 56 and 102 a company having a share capital, 
if so authorized by its articles, may by special resolution– 
(c) consolidate and divide all or any part of its share capital into shares of larger 
amount than its existing shares or consolidate and reduce the number of the issued 
no par value shares; 
(i) convert any of its shares, whether issued or not, into shares of another class. 
Section 36(2) of the 2008 Companies Act states as follows: 
The authorisation and classification of shares, number of authorised shares of each 
class and the preferences, rights, limitations and other terms associated with each 
class of shares, as set out in the company's memorandum of Incorporation, may be 
changed only by- 
an amendment of the memorandum of incorporation by special resolution of the 
shareholders or the board of the company, in the manner contemplated in 
subsection 3 except to the extent that the memorandum of incorporation provides 
otherwise.  
If the company has made use of section 36(2), the number of issued shares will be 
altered legally to "shares of larger amount", for instance 500 at R1 each converted 
into 250 at R2 each. To a potential investor, the result will indicate higher earnings 
per share (net profit divided by fewer shares),49 producing a promising book value 
per share in the balance sheet.50 The following table serves to illustrate this: 
 
 
                                        
47 Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
48 Cilliers et al Corporate Law 381. 
49 See Weaver and Keys Mergers 14. 
50 Walsh Key Management Ratios 170. 
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The above also applies to earnings per share. Equity increases through company 
profitability, as was discussed earlier and was illustrated by the debt-to-equity ratio. 
For example, if net profit is R1 000, earnings per share would be R4 per share (1 
000/250). Compare this to 500 issued shares, which would work out to earnings per 
share of R2 per share (1 000/500). If a company is listed on the stock exchange and 
the listed price per share is R8, R8/R4 per share equals 2, compared to R8/R2 per 
share, which equals 4. In economic reality, the former simply is more investment-
attractive. 
Not only does section 36(2) influence the earnings-per-share ratio, but it affects 
other financial ratios as well. Section 36(2) can be utilised to alter the composition of 
the share capital of a company by converting certain shares into redeemable 
preference shares. Although the earnings-per-share ratio will be unchanged by the 
alteration, the return-on-equity ratio will be affected.51 Redeemable preference 
shares are excluded52 from the shareholders fund; therefore, without increasing the 
                                        
51 Marx Investment Management 139; Klein v Kalosus Holdings Ltd 2003 SA 6 SA 198 (T), where 
the court dealt with a reduction in share capital; Correia et al Financial Management 205. 
52 Cilliers et al Korporatiewe Reg 224, 337. The authors explain redeemable shares as a "… hibriede 
vorm van aandele en skuldbriewe met eienskappe van beide … alhoewel hul suiwer as aandele 
beskou word". Also see SAICA Earnings. 
Number of shares Equity Book value 
R1 x 500 R1 000 R2 per share 
*(1 000/500 = 2) 
R2 X 250  
*(s 75(1)(c)) 
R1 000 R4 per share 
*(1 000/250 = 4) 
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net profits of a company, the return on equity will indicate a greater return, as 
follows:53 
Net profit Equity Return on equity 
R100 R1 000 10% 
*(100/1 000 = 10) 
R100 R500 (without 
redeemable pref. shares) 
20% 
*(100/500=20) 
This artificial method of altering the status of "shares" can convert any share-capital 
company into a company that is attractive to investors, by means of skilful financial 
engineering as permitted by section 36(2). Also, the 2008 Companies Act provides 
for the conversion of shares into other classes of shares in terms of section 41(3). 
Moreover, the 2008 Act and the 2007 Bill, in sections 36(3)(a) and 34(2)(a), also 
make provision for increasing or decreasing the number of shares. In essence, 
sections 36(3)(a) or 34(2)(a) allow for an artificial increase in earnings per share 
without complying with section 4 of the 2008 Act, as was discussed earlier. 
The following represent some guidelines as to which companies should ideally be 
allowed to buy back shares, and which not. The same rationale should be applied to 
the use of section 36(2). 
                                        
53 Walsh Key Management Ratios 182. The stock market price of a share, divided by the book value 
of a share, must produce the same ratio when dividing the return on equity through the earnings 
yield. 
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5 Economic categories of companies 
5.1 A company experiencing fewer net profits than in previous financial 
years  
A company that experiences fewer retained profits along with increased liabilities will 
command less financial leverage to conduct business continuously,54 and poses a 
greater risk of future liquidation or financial collapse.55 Under such circumstances, a 
company should not be allowed to acquire its own shares.56 See the following table 
as an illustration: 
1998 financial year 1999 financial year 
R10 net profit R5 net profit 
10 issued shares 10 issued shares, or buy back 5 
Earnings per share are R1 
*(10/10 = 1) 
Earnings per share are R0,5 
*(5/10 = .5) 
Earnings per share are R1 
*(5/5 = 1) 
R1 is more investment-attractive 
                                        
54 Walsh Key Management Ratios 190. Increased liabilities can create increased profit as well as 
increased risk. The increase in liabilities should therefore increase the value of shareholders' 
equity at the same time. However, if the ratio/balance between debt and equity is increased 
beyond a prudent level - although this may indicate an increased earnings yield or a stronger 
return on equity - it will serve to reduce the total company or shareholders' value in the long 
term. 
55 Atkinson Financial Collapse 22; De Koker Roekelose of Bedrieglike Dryf van Besigheid 47; Vigario 
Managerial Accounting 296. 
56 Donnan 1996 C & SLJ 101, which contains an interesting account of the business rules on share 
ratios. 
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than R0,5. The R1 is called 
"artificial investment 
attractiveness".  
5.2  A company with a marginal or high growth rate 
An increase or growth in the top line (the turnover) will increase the company's 
additional current assets (for example cash) with which to conduct business 
continuously.57 It is therefore very important to understand in what way the 
company financed the increase (the growth) in turnover.58 If the company did so by 
means of increased liabilities, its profitability may be negatively influenced if the 
anticipated increase in the top line is not achieved, resulting in a decrease in net 
profit. This would constitute a poor financial position like that in paragraph 5.1 
above. On the other hand, marginal or high growth achieved through current assets 
will lead to net profits that are linear to the increase in the top line. 
An increase in liabilities and a decrease in profitability will be an indication that the 
growth and profits are not in equilibrium and, consequently, the earnings per share 
will decrease. The board of directors must therefore adjust the growth rate of the 
company to yield favourable profitability results, as evidenced by the earnings-per-
share ratio. Unless these circumstances are achieved, this type of company should 
also not be allowed to acquire its own shares as a method of artificially increasing 
the value of its shares. 
                                        
57 Axiam Holdings v Deloitte & Touche 2006 1 SA 237 (SCA); AASB 2005 
http://www.aasb.co.au/pronouncements/aasb_standards_2005.htm; Dempsey and Pieters 
Inleiding 69 - "[w]inste is inkomste minus uitgawes"; Correia et al Financial Management 512 - 
the company's operations may create profit, but its future continuation depends on the 
availability of cash. 
58 Marx Investment Management 145; Walsh Key Management Ratios 122. To determine the cash-
flow cycle, stock will be divided by the top line (sales), multiplied by 365 (ie expressed in days). 
The same approach will be used to determine days to the payment of accounts and account 
payments received. After calculating all the days, these must be added up and the accounts paid 
deducted, indicating the number of days on which there must be sufficient cash. This number of 
days divided by sales, multiplied by 365, as well as the predetermined growth in sales will 
express the amount of cash necessary to sustain the cash-flow cycle. 
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The following section serves to explain the concept of artificial increases in more 
detail, before it is illustrated with reference to a case law example.  
6 Linearity between assets, profits and growth as a requirement to 
allow a buy-back of shares 
6.1 The concept 
Establishing whether assets, growth and net profit are in equilibrium, or linear to 
each other, requires a simple financial calculation or mere common sense.59 For 
example, if the current assets (cash) are being used adequately to produce an 
increase or growth in the top line, the direct result should be an increase in net 
profits or equity reflected in a promising earnings-per-share ratio. 
On the other hand, if a company increases its liabilities to finance a buy-back of its 
own shares, this will affect the profitability of the company negatively.60 Under such 
circumstances there will be greater pressure on the current assets to increase not 
only the top line61 but to ensure that the additional liabilities deducted in the income 
statement will disclose favourable net profits. In an economic reality, the possibility 
arises that the current assets will not be sufficient to maintain previous profitability 
results owing to the additional burden of financing. 
                                        
59 Rappaport Creating Shareholder Value 18. The cost of equity is 12%. To illustrate the 12% in 
practice, consider the following: The turnover of a company is R200. An increase/growth of 10% 
will increase the turnover to R220 (R15 investment). If the company invested R30, 
sales/turnover must be increased by 20% in order to create equity value. If sales increased by 
only 10%, although earnings per share may be higher, the value of the equity is less. This is 
because the amount of cash invested is neither equal to the growth rate nor at least 20%. 
60 Marx Investment Management 133. 
61 Pretorius et al Company Law (5th ed) 586, where the authors cite Ammonia Soda Co Ltd v 
Chamberlain, where the court in 1918 passed clear judgment on the importance of turnover 
(circulating capital) in relation to perpetual or everlasting existence. Since a company's focus is 
on circulating capital the intention is that the said capital be returned to the company at an 
increased (internal rate of return) rate - in other words, consisting of extra profits. 
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6.2 Case law example of non-linear assets, growth and profit 
In the Rosslare case,62 the assets, growth and profit of the company must be 
assumed not to have been in balance, owing to the fact that the company had 
redeemed a liability through allotting additional shares. The asset concerned was a 
block of flats in which a member/shareholder could occupy a flat without paying 
rent. The plaintiff argued that the occupation of a flat was in fact a reduction of the 
capital of the company. The court held that this was not so. 
It must be respectfully stated that the case seems to have been decided incorrectly. 
To illustrate why, the following liability example is again used. A liability places 
pressure on the top line/turnover of a company to produce sufficient net profits. If a 
liability is reduced, it follows that there will be increased net profits, evidenced by an 
increased earnings-per-share ratio.63 
Net profit before reducing the 
liability/loan 
Net profit after reducing 
the liability/loan 
R10 R11 
Equity before loan is reduced Equity after loan is 
reduced 
R100 R150 
  
                                        
62 Rosslare v Registrar of Companies 1972 2 SA 524 (D). 
63 Brews 1987 S Afr J Bus Manag 10; Donnan 1996 C & SLJ 101. 
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Return on equity before 
reducing the liability 
Return on equity after 
reducing the liability 
10% 
*(10/100 = 10) 
7% 
*(11/150 = 7) 
The increase in net profits stemming from the reduced liability will increase the 
earnings-per-share ratio.64 
Applying this logic to the case cited above, the occupation of a flat requires rent 
(growth) to be paid, and will consequently increase the top line linearly to net 
profits, which implies an increase in earnings per share. If rent is not paid, the asset 
or flat is not linear to the top line and, consequently, there is no increase in earnings 
per share. It is well understood that if rent is not paid, it dilutes the value of the 
lease agreement, and thus also the value of the shares of the company as a going 
concern. 
Top line or 
turnover 
Issued 
shares 
Earnings per 
share 
Net profit 
R500 (rent not 
paid) 
50 1 
*(50/50 = 1) 
R50 
R620 (rent paid) 50 3.4 
*(170/50 = 3.4) 
R170 
                                        
64 Marx Investment Management 131. 
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From the table above, it is clear that the extra growth experienced in the top line as 
a direct result of the rental income indicates linearity between the rental income, 
growth and profitability through the earnings-per-share ratio. When rent is not paid, 
the number of issued shares (50) can be reduced to 15 to equal earnings per share 
similar to those if rent were paid - 50/15 equals 3.3 (3.4 in the above table) - by 
making use of section 36(2). For this reason, it is submitted that clever financial 
engineering should also be subject to section 4 or at least the giving of a reason as 
to why the company requires a decrease in the number of issued shares so as to 
avoid an artificial increase in earnings per share.65 
7 More case law: earnings per share and specific performance 
In the Haynes case,66 Judge De Villiers dealt with the matter of the court's discretion 
to grant an order for specific performance. There are certain principles affecting the 
court's discretion not to order specific performance if the same result could be 
achieved by ordering the payment of damages. A favourable economic reality may 
be achieved by ordering damages instead of specific performance. 
In the Benson case,67 however, the Appellate Division rejected the latter principle. In 
terms of the general principles of breach of contract, the innocent party has a right 
to elect either specific performance or damages.68 The plaintiff in the Benson case 
purchased 171 500 shares, but received delivery of only 107 900. The plaintiff 
claimed specific performance of 63 600. The court granted the order on the basis of 
equity and in accordance with public policy.69 If the court had applied the English-law 
principle as found in the Haynes case, the company that had failed to deliver the 
                                        
65 Pretorius et al Company Law (6th ed) 147. The auditors can also make use of tax returns to 
create higher apparent profits for a company. Tax returns differ from deferred tax on the basis 
of the delivery of money. Deferred tax is not money received by the company, because the 
Receiver of Revenue will debit the credit amount in the income statement. The reason behind 
this philosophy is that the company is a going concern. 
66 Haynes v King William's Town Municipality 1951 2 SA 371 (A) 378; Wessels 1920 SALJ 265. 
67 Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 1 SA 776 (A). The Benson case also cited Rex v 
Milne and Erleigh (7) 1951 1 SA 791 (A) 873: "…[I]n contracts for the sale of shares which are 
daily dealt in on the market and can be obtained without difficulty, specific performance will not 
ordinarily be granted." 
68 Kerr Law of Sale 598; Kerr Principles of Contract 677. 
69 Pollard 1995 C & SLJ 353. 
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additional 63 600 shares would have increased its earnings per share, as these  
63 600 would not have been taken into account when calculating earnings per 
share.70 
8 Conclusion 
The Companies Act of 1973 did not make any provision for a maximum or minimum 
amount of capital required to float a company, or for a minimum number of shares 
to be issued.71 It is therefore possible for the promoters to excessively exercise their 
discretion when deciding on the authorised share capital, and later tailor-make (by 
buying back shares) or financially engineer the share capital structure in accordance 
with the business potential of the company, in order to generate an attractive 
earnings per share, especially in respect of listed companies. 
This has not been altered by the Companies Act of 2008. Besides the latter statutory 
regulation, as was discussed earlier, it is consequently proposed that trafficking in 
shares (such as the buy-back of shares) must be prohibited if the purpose of a buy-
back is to artificially increase the company's investment attractiveness.72 In addition, 
the buy-back of shares could easily be avoided by making use of section 36(2), 
which requires no solvency/liquidity ratios or any authorisation required in the 
memorandum of incorporation to amend the number of issued shares.73 All that is 
required is a special resolution to amend the number of shares. 
  
                                        
70 Kerr Law of Sale 599; Ribstein 1992 Nw U L Rev 284. 
71 The rules of the JSE require shares to be issued for at least R1 per share. 
72  Berelowitz 1979 De Rebus 199, 202; Brews 1987 S Afr J Bus Manag 10. 
73  S 75 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 required authorisation to amend the number of issued 
shares in the articles of association as well as a special resolution. 
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